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Abstract—A new random geometric graph model, the so-called
secrecy graph, is introduced and studied. The graph represents
a wireless network and includes only edges over which secure
communication in the presence of eavesdroppers is possible.
The underlying point process models considered are lattices
and Poisson point processes. In the lattice case, analogies to
standard bond and site percolation can be exploited to determine
percolation thresholds. In the Poisson case, the node degrees are
determined and percolation is studied using analytical bounds
and simulations. It turns out that a small density of eavesdroppers
already has a drastic impact on the connectivity of the secrecy
graph.
I. INTRODUCTION
There has been growing interest in information-theoretic
secrecy. To study the impact of the secrecy constraint on
the connectivity of ad hoc networks, we introduce a new
type of random geometric graph, the so-called secrecy graph,
that represents the network or communication graph including
only links over which secure communication is possible. We
assume that a transmitter can choose the rate very close to the
capacity of the channel to the intended receiver, so that any
eavesdropper further away than the receiver cannot intercept
the message. This translates into a simple geometric constraint
for secrecy which is reflected in the secrecy graph. In this
initial investigation, we study some of the properties of the
secrecy graph.
II. THE SECRECY GRAPH
Let Gˆ = (φ, Eˆ) be a geometric graph in Rd, where
φ = {xi} ⊂ Rd represents the locations of the nodes, also
referred to as the “good guys”. We can think of this graph
as the unconstrained network graph that includes all possible
edges over the good guys could communicate if there were no
secrecy constraints.
Take another set of points ψ = {yi} ⊂ Rd representing
the locations of the eavesdroppers or “bad guys”. These are
assumed to be known to the good guys.
Let Dx(r) be the (closed) d-dimensional ball of radius
r centered at x, and let δ(x, y) = ‖x − y‖ be a distance
metric, typically Euclidean distance. Further, let φ(A) and
ψ(A) denote the number of points of φ or ψ falling in A ⊂ Rd.
Based on Gˆ, we define the following secrecy graphs (SGs):
The directed secrecy graph: ~G = (φ, ~E). Replace all edges
in Eˆ by two directional edges. Then remove all edges −−→xixj
for which ψ (Dxi(δ(xi, xj))) > 0, i.e., there is at least one
eavesdropper in the ball.
(a) Directed SG ~G (b) Basic SG G (c) Enhanced SG G′
Fig. 1. Example for secrecy graphs. The dots are the good guys, the cross
the eavesdropper. The underlying graph is assumed to be fully connected so
that the secrecy graphs include all edges along which secure communication
is possible.
From this directed graph, two undirected graphs are derived:
The basic secrecy graph: G = (φ,E), where the (undi-
rected) edge set E is
E , {xixj : −−→xixj ∈ ~E and −−→xjxi ∈ ~E} .
The enhanced secrecy graph: G′ = (φ,E′), where
E′ , {xixj : −−→xixj ∈ ~E or −−→xjxi ∈ ~E} .
Clearly, E ⊂ E′. The difference is that edges in E permit
secure bidirectional communication while edges in E′ only
allow secure communication in one direction. However, this
one-way link may be used to transmit a one-time pad so that
the other node can reply secretly. In doing so, the link capacity
would drop from 1/2 in each direction to 1/3. Fig. 1 shows
an example in R2 for the three types of secrecy graphs. based
on the same underlying fully connected graph Gˆ.
One way to assess the impact of the secrecy requirement is
to determine the secrecy ratios
η =
|E|
|Eˆ| =
N¯
¯ˆ
N
; η′ =
|E′|
|Eˆ| =
N¯ ′
¯ˆ
N
, (1)
where N¯ , N¯ ′ > N¯ , and ¯ˆN are the average node degrees of
the respective graphs. For η ≈ 1, the impact of the secrecy
requirement is negligible while for small η it severely prunes
the graph.
For the directed graph, the mean in- and out-degrees are
equal, so we define ~N , N¯out = N¯ in = | ~E|/|φ|. Since the
edge sets of G and G′ are a partition of the edge set of the
undirected multigraph containing all edges in ~G, the following
holds:
Fact 1 The mean degrees are related by
N¯ + N¯ ′ = 2N¯ in = 2N¯out . (2)
Furthermore, the degrees of all nodes x ∈ φ are bounded by
Nx 6 min{N inx , Noutx } 6 max{N inx , Noutx }
6 N ′x 6 N
in
x +N
out
x . (3)
In the example in Fig. 1, (2) yields 10/9 + 22/9 = 32/9.
These graphs become interesting if the locations of the
vertices are stochastic point processes. We will use Φ and
Ψ as the corresponding random variables.
Our goal is to study the properties of the resulting random
geometric graphs, including degree distributions and perco-
lation thresholds. We will consider two cases, lattices and
Poisson point processes.
A. Lattice model
Let the underlying graph be the standard square lattice in
Z
2
, i.e., Gˆ = L2, where edge exists between all pairs of points
with Euclidean distance 1. Let Ψ be obtained from random
independent thinning of a regular point set where each point
exists with probability p, independently of all others. Let the
corresponding secrecy graphs be denoted as ~Gp, Gp, and G′p.
Let θ(p) be the probability that the component containing the
origin is infinite1. Then the percolation threshold is defined as
pc = inf{p : θ(p) = 0} . (4)
B. Poisson model
Let the underlying graph be Gilbert’s disk graph Gˆr [1],
where Φ is a Poisson point process (PPP) of intensity 1 in
R
2 and two vertices are connected if their distance is at most
r. Ψ is another, independent, PPP of intensity λ. Denote the
secrecy graphs by ~Gλ,r, Gλ,r, and G′λ,r. With θ(λ, r) being
the probability that the component containing the origin (or
any arbitrary fixed node) is infinite, the percolation threshold
radius for Gˆr is
rG , sup{r : θ(0, r) = 0} ≈ 1.198 , (5)
where the subscript G indicates that this is Gilbert’s critical
radius which is not known exactly but the bounds 1.1979 <
rc < 1.1988 were established with 99.99% confidence in [2].
For radii larger than rG, we define
λc(r) , inf{λ : θ(λ, r) = 0} , r > rG. (6)
For the analyses, we assume that there is a node in Φ at the
origin. This does not affect the distributional properties of the
PPP.
The parameter r indicating the maximum range of trans-
mission can be related to standard communication parameters
as follows: Assume a standard path loss law with attenuation
exponent α, a transmit power P , a noise floor W , and a
minimum SNR Θ for reliable communication. Then
r =
(
P
ΘW
)1/α
. (7)
1In the directed case, to be precise, we consider oriented percolation and
let θ(p) be the probability that the out-component is finite, i.e., that there are
directed paths from the origin to an infinite number of nodes. Alternatively
(or in addition) we could consider the in-component of the origin.
III. PROPERTIES OF THE LATTICE SECRECY GRAPHS
Consider first the graph G′p for the case where a bad guy is
placed (with probability p) in the middle of each edge in L2,
i.e.,
Ψ = {x ∈ (Z2+(1/2, 0))∪ (Z2+(0, 1/2)) : Ux < p} , (8)
where Ux is iid uniformly distributed in [0, 1].
This case is analogous to bond percolation on the two-
dimensional square lattice [3], so:
Fact 2 The percolation threshold for G′p is pc = 1/2.
For p = 1/2, the density of bad guys is 1, the same as the
density of good guys. So the density of bad guys only needs
to be a factor 1 − ǫ smaller than the density of good guys,
and the graph still percolates, for any ǫ > 0. Close to that
threshold η′ = 1/2.
If we put the bad guys on the lattice points themselves (with
probability p), the situation is analogous to site percolation on
L
2
, for which the critical probability is unknown but estimated
to be around 0.59, so pc ≈ 0.41. In this case the maximum
density of bad guys is only 0.41.
So it seems having the eavesdroppers at the locations
indicated in (8) causes the least “damage” to the connectivity
of the secrecy graph among all regular Ψ.
IV. PROPERTIES OF THE POISSON SECRECY GRAPHS
A. Isolation probabilities for r =∞
Fact 3 The probability that the origin o cannot talk to anyone
in ~Gλ,∞ (out-isolation) is
P[Nout = 0] =
λ
λ+ 1
. (9)
In Gλ,∞:
P[N = 0] =
cλ
cλ+ 1
(10)
where c = 43 +
√
3
2π = 1.609.
For the directed graph, this is simply the probability that the
nearest neighbor in the combined process Φ ∪ Ψ (of density
1+λ) is an eavesdropper. In the basic graph, let x denote the
origin’s nearest neighbor in Φ and let R = ‖x‖. For N > 0, we
need Do(R)∪Dx(R) to be free of eavesdroppers. The area of
the two intersecting disks is cπR2 for c = 4/3+
√
3/(2π), and
the probability density (pdf) of R is pR(r) = 2πr exp(−πr2)
(Rayleigh with mean 1/2) [4]. So
P[N > 0] = ER[exp(−λcπR2)] = 1
cλ+ 1
. (11)
The probability of in-isolation P[N in = 0] is smaller than
P[Nout = 0], since for each node x ∈ Φ\{o}, there must be
at least one bad guy in Dx(‖x‖). Clearly, this probability is
smaller compared to (9) where only the nearest eavesdropper
matters. On the other hand, the in-degree is less likely than the
out-degree to be large since a significantly larger area needs
to be free of bad guys. The isolation probability P[N ′ = 0] is
the smallest of all isolation probabilities.
B. Degree distributions
Proposition 4 The out-degree of o in ~Gλ,∞ is geometric with
mean 1/λ.
Proof: Consider the sequence of nearest neighbors of o
in the combined process Φ∪Ψ. Nout = n if the closest n are
in Φ and the (n + 1)-st is in Ψ. Since these are independent
events,
P[Nout = n] =
λ
1 + λ
(
1
1 + λ
)n
. (12)
Alternatively, the distribution can be obtained as follows:
Let R be the distance to the closest bad guy, i.e., R =
miny∈Ψ ‖y‖. We have
P[Nout = n] = ER
[
exp(−πR2) (πR
2)n
n!
]
, (13)
where the pdf of R is pR(r) = 2πrλ exp(−πλr2).
For general r, we have:
Proposition 5 The out-degree distribution of ~Gλ,r is
P[Nout = n] =
λ
(
1− Γ(n,a)Γ(n)
)
+ exp(−a)ann!
(λ+ 1)n+1
, (14)
where a = πr2(λ + 1), and Γ(·, ·) is the upper incomplete
gamma function. The probability of out-isolation is
P[Nout = 0] =
exp(−πr2(λ+ 1)) + λ
1 + λ
, (15)
and the mean out- and in-degrees are
ENout = EN in =
1
λ
(1− exp(−λπr2)) . (16)
The mean degree of the basic graph Gλ,r is
EN =
1
cλ
(1− exp(−cλπr2)) , (17)
where c = 43 +
√
3
2π .
Proof: If there is no bad guy inside Dx(r) — which is the
case with probability P0 = exp(−λπr2) — then the number
is simply Poisson with mean πr2. If there is a bad guy at
distance R, the number is Poisson with mean πR2. So we
have
P[Nout = n] =P0 exp(−πr2) (πr
2)n
n!
+ (1− P0)ER<r
[
exp(−πR2) (πR
2)n
n!
]
,
which, after some manipulations, yields (14). The mean is
obtained more directly using Campbell’s theorem [5] which
says that for stationary point processes with intensity µ in R2
and non-negative measurable f ,
E
[∑
x∈Φ
f(x)
]
= µ
∫
R2
f(x)dx .
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Fig. 2. Distribution of the node degree with and without power constraints.
The solid bold curve shows the distribution (14) for r = 1 and λ = 1/5. The
dashed curve is the Poisson distribution with mean π (which results when
r = 1, λ = 0), and the dash-dotted curve is the geometric distribution with
mean 5 (which results when λ = 1/5, r →∞).
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Fig. 3. Left: Mean out-degree of ~G1/10,r . The vertical line goes through
the inflection point and indicates the boundary between the power-limited and
the secrecy-limited regime. At the inflection point, r = rT = (2πλ)−1/2 =p
5/π ≈ 1.26. Right: The curve λ = (2πr2)−1
bordering the power-limited and the secrecy-limited regimes. As r → ∞ or
λ→∞, the network becomes secrecy-limited and the degree distribution is
geometric. As r → 0 or λ→ 0, the network is power-limited and the degree
distribution is Poisson.
Applied to the mean out-degree (µ = 1) we obtain
ENout =
∑
x∈Φ
P(−→ox ∈ ~E) = E
∑
x∈Φ\{o}
‖x‖<r
exp(−λπ‖x‖2)
= 2π
∫ r
0
x exp(−λπx2)dx . (18)
By replacing the area πr2 by cπr2 (area of two overlapping
disks of radius r and distance r), the same calculation yields
(17).
The probability of isolation can directly be obtained from
considering the two possibilities for isolation: Either there is
no node at all within distance r or there is one node (or more)
within r and the nearest one is bad. So, using a as in the
proposition, P[Nout = 0] = exp(−a)+ (1− exp(−a))λ/(1+
λ). Since Φ has intensity 1, the isolation probability equals
the density of isolated nodes.
As λ→ 0, we obtain the Poisson isolation probability and
for r → ∞ we get the geometric isolation probability (12).
Also in (14) we can observe the expected behavior in the
limits λ, r → 0 and λ, r →∞. So the two-parameter distribu-
tion (14) includes the Poisson distribution and the geometric
distribution as special cases. Fig. 2 shows an example of the
resulting distributions for r = 1 and λ = 1/5.
As a function of r, the mean degree increases approximately
as πr2 for small r (this is the region where the degree is
power-limited) and has a cap at 1/λ (due to the secrecy
condition). Hence there exists a power-limited and a secrecy-
limited regime, and the inflection point of EN(r), which is
rT = (2πλ)
−1/2 is a suitable boundary. This is illustrated
in Fig. 3. Generally, the curve 2πr2 = 1/λ separates the two
regimes. Note that in the power-limited regime, the distribution
is close to Poisson, whereas in the secrecy-limited regime, it is
closer to geometric. Using the maximum slope s of ENout(r),
a simple piecewise linear upper bound on the mean degree is
ENout(r) < min{sr, 1
λ
} , s ,
√
2π
eλ
. (19)
This bound is reasonably tight for λ not too small.
As a function of λ, the mean degree is monotonically
decreasing from πr2 to 0, upper bounded by 1/λ.
The transmission range (power) needed to get within ǫ of
the maximum mean out-degree (for r =∞) is
rǫ =
√
− log ǫ
λπ
(20)
For example, r0.01 = 1.21/
√
λ achieves a mean out-degree of
0.99/λ.
Next we establish bounds on the node degree distribution
in the basic graph Gλ,∞. Let R be the distance of the nearest
bad guy. If the second-nearest bad guy is at distance at
least 2R, which happens with probability exp(−λπ3R2), then
bidirectional secure communication is possible to any good
guy in the area aπR2 where a = 2/3 +
√
3/(4π) ≈ 0.80
(circle minus a segment of height R/2). As a lower bound,
we consider the circle of radius R/2. For sure bidirectional
communication is possible to any node within that distance.
(This bound would be tight if there were many more bad guys,
all at the same distance R.) So we have
n∑
k=0
ER
[
exp(−A)A
k
k!
]
< P[N 6 n] <
n∑
k=0
ER
[
exp(−B)B
k
k!
]
where A = aπR2 and B = bπR2 with b = 1/4. The bounds
are geometric:
1−
(
a
a+ λ
)n+1
< P[N 6 n] < 1−
(
b
b + λ
)n+1
(21)
Since EN =
∑
P[N > n], the bounds a/λ > EN > b/λ
for the mean degree follow. From (17) we already know that
EN = 1/(λc) ≈ 0.62/λ.
Lastly, in this subsection, we consider the enhanced graph.
Proposition 6 The mean degree EN ′ in the enhanced graph
G′λ,r is
EN ′ =
2
λ
(1− exp(−λπr2))− 1
cλ
(1− exp(−cλπr2)) . (22)
Proof: This follows by combining (2), (16), and (17).
C. Secrecy ratios
Using the mean degree established in (17) we obtain
η(λ, r) =
1− exp(−cλπr2)
cλπr2
. (23)
η(λ, r) is decreasing in both r and λ. η′(λ, r) follows from
(22). Of interest are also the relative edge densities of the
enhanced and basic graphs:
Fact 7 At least a fraction 3π/(5π+3√3) ≈ 0.45 of the edges
in the enhanced graph G′λ,r are present in the basic graph
Gλ,r.
The ratio EN/EN ′ is 1 for small λr2 and reaches its minimum
as λr2 → ∞, where it is (2c − 1)−1 with c as in (17). The
consequence is that in some graphs, more than 50% of the
links can only be used securely in one direction (unless one-
time pads are used).
D. Edge lengths
We consider the distribution of the length of the edges
in ~Gλ,∞. For each node, its nearest bad guy determines the
maximum length of an out-edge. So we intuitively expect the
edge length distribution to approximately inherit the distribu-
tion of the distance to the nearest bad guy. Simulation studies
reveal that indeed the edge length distribution is very close to
Rayleigh with mean 1/(2
√
λ), with only very slightly higher
probabilities for longer edges—which is expected since nodes
whose nearest bad guy is far will have many long edges on
average and thus skew the distribution.
In the power-limited regime, with r finite and λ → 0, the
edge length pdf converges to the usual 2x/r2, 0 6 x 6 r.
E. Oriented percolation of ~Gλ,r
We are studying oriented out-percolation in ~Gλ,r , i.e., the
critical region in the (λ, r)-plane for which there is a positive
probability that the out-component containing the origin has
infinite size.
Fact 8 λc(r) is monotonically increasing for r > rG, and we
have
0 < lim
r→∞λc(r) < 1 . (24)
In other words, there exists a λ∞ < 1 such that for λ > λ∞,
G′λ,r does not percolate for any r.
This follows from the facts that for fixed r the mean degree
is continuously decreasing to 0 as a function of λ, and for
λ < 1, the mean degree is smaller than 1 even for r =∞, so
percolation is impossible. We will use λ∞ to denote the limit
in (24). For intensities smaller than that, we define
rc(λ) , sup{r : θ(λ, r) = 0} , λ 6 λ∞ . (25)
From the monotonic decrease of the mean degree in λ
follows:
Fact 9 The percolation radius rc(λ) is monotonically increas-
ing with λ and has a vertical asymptote at λ∞.
Conjecture 10 rc(λ) is convex (and, consequently, λc(r) is
concave):
d2rc(λ)
dλ2 > 0 ∀ 0 6 λ < λ∞ (26)
It follows that
rc(λ) > rG + cλ , where c ,
drc(λ)
dλ
∣∣∣
λ=0
. (27)
Simulation results show that λ∞ ≈ 0.1499 with a standard
deviation of 5.8 · 10−4 over 200 runs.
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Fig. 4. The simulated critical density λc(r) vs. log10(r) together with a
simple exponential approximation. Each simulated point is the average of 30
runs.
Since λc(r) is concave and converges to a finite λ∞, we
may conjecture that it can be well approximated by a function
of the form:
λc(r) ≈ λ∞ − exp(a− br) , r > rG , (28)
where a and b are related through a = logλ∞ + brG. Indeed
simulation results (see Fig. 4) reveal that for b = 4, λ∞ =
0.1499, and a = 2
√
2, we obtain an excellent approximation.
Similarly,
rc(λ) ≈ a
b
− 1
b
log(λ∞ − λ) , λ < λ∞ . (29)
It follows that the constant c in Conj. 10 is c = (bλ∞)−1 =
5/3, and the slope of λc(r) at r = r+G is 3/5.
For the critical graph ~Gλ,rc(λ), it turns out that both P[N =
0] and EN are increasing with λ.
A good empirically derived approximation is
P[Noutc = 0] ≈
1
80
+
4
5
λ , λ < λ∞ . (30)
For the mean out-degree we have from (16) and (29)
ENoutc (λ) > πr
2
G +
11
4
λ . (31)
ENoutc (λ) is convex and reaches 1/λ∞ at λ = λ∞ per Prop. 4.
So percolation on the secrecy graph requires a higher mean
degree than Gilbert’s disk graph. Since the disk graph was
shown to require the highest mean degree among all germ-
grain random geometric graphs [6]–[8], we have established
that:
Fact 11 The secrecy graph is not equivalent to any germ-
grain random geometric graph.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We have introduced a new class of random geometric graphs
that captures the condition for secure communications in ad
hoc networks. For the lattice-based models, there exist direct
analogies to bond and site percolation problems. In Poisson-
based networks, we have derived the mean node degrees
and, in some cases, the distribution. As a byproduct, a two-
parameter distribution was found that includes the Poisson and
the geometric distribution as special cases. Based on the mean
degree, we defined power- and secrecy-limited regions in the
(λ, r)-plane. The percolation region {(r, λ) : θ(r, λ) > 0} was
bounded and numerically determined. In conclusion, the pres-
ence of eavesdroppers is rather harmful in the random case.
A (relative) density of 0.15 is sufficient to make percolation
impossible. Many interesting problems remain open; we hope
that this initial study sparks further investigations.
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